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Drafting New Model Rules on Sales: CFR as an Alternative 
to the CISG? 
Ingeborg Schwenzer * & Pascal Hachem ** 
Abstract 
The article compares basic structures of the sales part of the 2009 Draft Common Frame of 
Reference prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code (DCFR) to those of the 1980 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The authors 
focus first of all on general issues regarding the systematics of sales law and conclude that the 
interplay of specific sales law and general law of obligations within the DCFR is complicated and 
in some instances unclear, especially as far as remedies based on mistake and tort are concerned 
which concur to those based on breach of contract. In the second step the authors address those 
issues where the DCFR has deviated from the solutions ofthe CISG and hold that these deviations 
have been much to the disadvantage of the DCFR. This is in particular stated for the topics of non-
conformity as well as remedies for breach of contract. With regard to those legal questions that 
are not dealt with by the CISG, the authors analyse the ways in which the DCFR has filled these 
gaps. Three issues are addressed: Pre-contractual duties and liability, non-negotiated terms as weil 
as interest. Again, the authors find the solutions developed in the DCFR to be unconvincing. A 
final criticism is raised against the codifying style and the techniques employed in the drafting of 
the DCFR. As a final conclusion in the view of the authors the DCFR in its current state does not 
provide an alternative to the CISG for sales law, be it as an optional instrument or a toolbox. 
A. Introduction 
Before turning to the subject matter of our contribution let us shortly recall the 
role that the CISG nowadays plays in international commerce. 
Today the CISG has 74 Member States. Save for the United Kingdom as a 
prominent exception, this includes all major trade nations in the world. 1 The 
CISG thus in principle covers approximately 80% of all international sales 
contracts. An estimated 3,000 published court decisions and arbitral awards as 
well as an abundant number of scholarly writings, numerous conferences and 
last but not least the Annual Willem C Vis International Commercial Arbitration 
Moot show the prominent role the CISG plays in legal practice, legal science and 
legal education. 
Dr. iur., Prof. of Private Law, University ofBasel, Switzerland. 
" Dr. iur., Research Assistant and Lecturer, University of Basel, Switzerland. 
See for the relevant figures 1. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, The CISG - Successes and Pitfa/ls, 57 
American Journal ofComparative Law 457, at 460 et seq. (2009). Brazil, Portugal and Turkey will 
follow in the near future. 
European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. XI, no. 4, pp 459-4 72. 
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Furthermore, the CISG has exerted significant influence on an international as 
weil as domestic level. To name but a few: The PICC, the PECL, the EC Directive 
on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods2 as weil as the OHADA General 
Commercial Act3 have all been based on the CISG. On a domestic level the 
Nordic legal systems, the Baltic states, many Eastern European legal systems 
and especially China took the CISG as blueprint for their revision of the law of 
contract. Even the modernisation of the German law of obligations was from the 
very beginning strongly influenced by the CISG. 
Although the DCFR drew heavily on the pre-existing unification efforts such 
as the CISG, PICC and foremost the PECL, there are considerable differences to 
the CISG with regard to sales contracts.4 This is mainly for two reasons. First, 
the provisions on sales in Book IV.A. themselves deviate from the provisions 
of the CISG. Second, these provisions have to be supplemented by the general 
provisions on contract formation and remedies in Books II and III of the DCFR 
which to an even greater extent are not in accord with those of the CISG. 
A major difference between CISG and DCFR relates to the role legal practice 
played in preparation and drafting of the respective rules. Whereas the practice 
was strongly involved in the preparation of the CISG, especially the ICC,5 the 
DCFR has been a mainly academic endeavour only followed by the so-called 
stakeholder process. 
With these general remarks in mind, we will now turn to more specific 
questions relating to the comparison of the CISG and the DCFR, assuming that 
the model rules of the DCFR will be used in a future CFR. 
B. General Questions 
Let us begin with some general questions regarding the codification of sales law 
in the two instruments. 
1. Scope of Sales Provisions 
The CISG covers international sales contracts. lt thereby focuses on B2B 
contracts. Consumer sales are practically excluded.6 The drafters of the DCFR 
have consciously opted for another approach. The DCFR purports to cover all sales 
contracts, that means B2B, B2C and even C2C transactions. This implies that the 
rules of the DCFR go much further than those of the CISG having incorporated 
Directive 99/44/EC ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council of25 May 1999 on certain 
aspects ofthe sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees OJ 1999 L 171112. 
3 Acte Uniforme sur Je Droit Commercial General/Uniform Act Relating to General Commercial 
Law. 
4 See for an analysis U. Huber, Modellregeln fiir ein Europäisches Kau/recht, 16 Zeitschrift für 
Europäisches Privatrecht 708, at 708 et seq. (2008). 
5 The ICC had already commented on drafts prior to the Vienna Conference and offered proposals, 
see Document A/CONF.97/9. 
6 See Arts. 1(3), 2(a) CISG. 
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the existing harmonised rules on sales eontraets, whieh mainly aim at eonsumer 
proteetion. This often leads to results that are unaeeeptable for international B2B 
sales, let alone the sheer eomplexity following from the ambitious aim to bring 
together irreeoneilable expeetations and interests of global eommeree and loeal 
eonsumer proteetion. 
II. Interplay with General Law of Obligations 
As already mentioned, in the DCFR the rules on sales are established in Book 
IV.A. and have to be supplemented by the general part of the law of obligations, 
whereas the CISG eovers all aspeets from eontraet formation, obligations of the 
parties to remedies for breaeh. The distinetion of a general part and a speeifie 
part of obligations seems tobe mostly inspired by the German Civil Code.7 The 
dispute whether this teehnique is superior or inferior to an integral codifieation 
of sales eontraets has already reeeived mueh attention and shall not be diseussed 
any further. Suffiee to mention some of the most urgent problems arising from 
this approaeh. 
The interplay between a general part of obligations and a special law of 
sales neeessarily entails the <langer of ineonsistent solutions. 8 The most striking 
example in the DCFR are the rules on eure in ease of non-performanee. Under 
the general provisions the obligor may remedy any non-conformity in case 
of an early performanee as well as under eertain eonditions after the time for 
performanee has lapsed.9 In the sales part of the DCFR eure by the.seller seems 
tobe limited to eases of early performanee. 10 This possibility is further restricted 
to eases where eure does not eause the buyer unreasonable ineonvenienee or 
expenses. 11 The interplay of these provisions on eure is unclear. Probably, in eases 
of early performanee the eure provision of the sales part prevails aeeording to the 
principle of /ex specialis derogat legi generali. But how about eure after the date 
of performanee? Is it excluded or eould the seller rely on the general provisions? 
Highly problematic are issues of eoneurring remedies. Especially, the 
relationship between the rules on mistake and the remedies for non-conformity 
raises serious eoneems. Where already at the time of the conclusion of the contraet 
the goods are irreparably non-eonforming or subjeet to third party rights it may be 
argued that both parties are mistaken 12 and therefore, for example, the seller may 
reseind the eontraet under the general rules on mistake thus escaping liability for 
breaeh of eontraet under the sales provisions. By the same token, the buyer may 
rely on mistake notwithstanding that remedies for breaeh of eontraet are excluded, 
for example beeause the buyer has not given timely notiee of a non-eonformity. 
Legal systems are split on the question whether provisions on mistake may be 
See W. Ernst, Zur Struktur des CFR, in M. Schmidt-Kessel (Ed.), Der Gemeinsame 
Referenzrahmen - Entstehung, Inhalte, Anwendung 55, at 60 (2009). 
8 See id., at 68 et seq. 
Art. 111.-3:202(1), (2) DCFR. 
10 Art. IV.A.-2:203 DCFR. This rule is obviously based on Art. 37 CISG. 
11 Art. IV.A.-2:203(1) DCFR. 
12 Art. II.-7:201(1)(b)(iv) DCFR. 
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relied upon concurrently to those on remedies for breach of contract. Under the 
CISG it is now recognised by court decisions and the great majority of scholarly 
writings that the rules on mistake are inapplicable in case of breach of contract. 13 
In this regard the Convention has achieved a great degree of legal certainty. The 
DCFR remains silent on this question thus causing legal uncertainty. 
Similar problems arise where the breach of contract at the same time triggers 
tort remedies. Having regard to the extensive discussion this issue has caused in 
domestic legal systems, one might have expected a clarifying word in a modern 
instrument such as the DCFR. Under the CISG we are only slowly progressing 
with reconciling the different domestic approaches. 14 Under a new instrument it 
would again take decades to bring about clarity. Under the DCFR this problem is 
even aggravated by the fact that tort remedies and remedies for breach of contract 
seem to be on the same level, whereas under the CISG it can be argued that 
uniform sales law may not be jeopardised by domestic tort law. 
C. Amended Rules 
After these general questions, we would like to have a closer look at those core 
areas of sales law where the DCFR has deviated from the CISG. 
1. Non-Conformity 
The acid test for any sales law are the rules on non-conformity of the goods. 
The CISG offers clear and convincing solutions in this regard which have in 
many instances proven to yield satisfactory results. Consequently these provisions 
have served as a role model for domestic as well as the European legislator. 15 The 
CISG rules emphasise the importance of the contract being the first and foremost 
reference point for the conformity of the goods. 16 Only if the parties have not 
made provision in their contract for any specific features of the goods, the CISG 
establishes subsidiary presumptions to decide whether the goods conform to the 
contract. 17 
Without any need the DCFR has deviated from the convincing concept of the 
CISG. In particular, deviations were not dictated by consumer protection. Firstly, 
the DCFR does not recognise the important distinction between contractual 
13 See OGH, 13 April 2000, CISG-online 576; Cass civ !er, 14 May 1996, J.C.P. 1997, I, 
4009; LG Aachen, 14 May 1993, CISG-online 86; 1. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in I. Schwenzer 
(Ed.), Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) (2010), Art. 4, para. 19, [hereinafter referred to as 'Commentary'], I. Schwenzer, 
Commentary, Art. 35, paras. 46-48 with numerous references. 
14 See for an overview on the discussion and references Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 13, Art. 
5, paras. 12-15. 
15 In particular, Art. 2 of the Directive 99/44/EC, supra note 2, was based on Article 35 CISG 
which has thus found its way into all domestic legal systems which have implemented the Directive. 
16 See Art. 35(1) CISG. 
17 See Art. 35(2) CISG. 
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designation of conformity and the statutory default rule. Instead, it requires the 
goods to comply with contractual requirements as well as the default criteria 
for non-conformity18 thus relying on a mixed subjective/objective approach. 19 
This may well lead to absurd results as goods may be perfectly conforming to 
contractual requirements but not pass the objective test. Foodstuff that is no longer 
fit for human consumption may well be sold as animal food. Goods without a 
CE label that may not be sold in the EU may perfectly be fit for export to other 
regions in the world.20 
A further amendment is that statements by third persons on specific 
characteristics of the goods according to the DCFR have to be taken into account 
in determining the conformity of the goods.21 This rule having no counterpart 
in the CISG clearly has been inspired by the Directive on consumer sales22 and 
may cause severe problems in international B2B sales. Especially again, the 
relationship between the contractual requirements for conformity and the role of 
statements of third persons is unclear. 
Both the CISG and the DCFR require the goods to be free from any right or 
claim of a third party which is based on industrial or other intellectual property. 23 
However, whereas under the CISG goods must be free from these encumbrances 
in states contemplated by the parties for resale or altematively in the state of the 
buyer, 24 the DCFR does not contain any territorial restriction. Although this may 
be appropriate for a law exclusively dealing with contracts in one legal system, it 
is certainly unacceptable on a global scale. Although the seller may be expected 
to investigate existing intellectual property rights of third persons in certain 
countries where the buyer intends to resell the goods, this cannot hold true for 
any and all countries of the world. 
II. Remedies 
The second core area of any sales law codification is remedies in case of breach 
of contract. CISG and DCFR agree on the basic structure of remedies, as they 
apply the remedy oriented approach rather than the old Roman cause oriented 
approach. As concems the details of remedies, however, remarkable differences 
appear. 
18 See Art. IV.A.-2:301: 'The goods do not conform with the contract unless they: (a) are of the 
quantity, quality and description required by the contract [ ... ]; and (d) comply with the remaining 
Articles ofthis Section.' 
19 See Huber, supra note 4, at 719. 
20 See for the interplay of the CE mark and conformity of the goods Schwenzer, in Commentary, 
supra note 13, Art. 35, para. 14. 
21 Art. IV.A.-2:303 DCFR. 
22 Cf Art. 2(d) Directive 99/44/EC. 
23 See Art. 42 CISG; Art. IV.A.-2:306 DCFR. 
24 See Art. 42(1) CISG. 
464 Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem 
1. Specific Performance 
The first remedy to discuss is specific performance. As is well known, the CISG 
has not bridged the gap between Common Law and Civil Law legal systems 
concerning the general remedy of specific performance. Instead it leaves it to 
the court or arbitral tribunal to decide whether it enters a judgment for specific 
performance.25 lt has tobe emphasised that this compromise has not given rise 
to difficulties in practice. In accord with continental legal thinking the DCFR 
from a systematic perspective instead seems to envisage specific performance as 
the primary remedy.26 lt can be doubted, whether such an approach is acceptable 
to any Common Law lawyer. A reasonable restriction of the remedy of specific 
performance in case where the creditor should resort to a substitute transaction is 
only revealed to the experienced reader by a second look.27 
A special form of specific performance in case of non-conformity of the goods 
is repair and replacement. The CISG restricts the seller's obligation to replace 
non-conforming goods to cases where non-conformity amounts to a fundamental 
breach of contract in order to avoid costly and unreasonable transportation of 
the goods.28 This restriction is not found in the DCFR. lt may be questionable 
whether this even makes sense between a Lithuanian seller and a Portuguese 
buyer. lt certainly cannot serve as a model on the global scale. 
2. Avoidance of Contract 
Both the CISG as well as the DCFR in principle allow avoidance of contract in 
case of a fundamental breach of contract. Both sets of rules use the essentially 
same definition for the fundamentality of the breach.29 However, the DCFR goes 
one step further by holding that fundamentality is also given where the breach 
of contract is intentional or reckless.30 Although it may be conceded that the 
question whether there was an intentional breach may be taken into account when 
determining whether a breach is fundamental,3 1 holding every intentional breach 
tobe fundamental independent of its significance does not fit to international trade 
practices and cannot be justified by the legitimate interest of the non-breaching 
party. 
Differences can also be found in relation to the avoidance mechanism. Whereas 
the CISG always requires a declaration of avoidance for reasons of legal certainty 
25 See Art. 28 CISG: 'lf, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is 
entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a 
judgement for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of 
similar contracts of sale not govemed by this Convention.' 
26 See Huber, supra note 4, at 714 et seq. 
27 See id„ at 722 et seq. 
28 See Art. 46(2) CISG. 
29 Cf Art. 25 CISG; Art. IIl.-3:502(2)(a) DCFR. 
30 See Art. IIl.-3:502(2)(b) DCFR. 
31 CISG-AC Opinion no. 5, The Buyer 's Right to Avoid the Contract in Case of Non-Conforming 
Goods or Documents, 7 May 2005, Badenweiler (Germany). Rapporteur: Professor Dr. Ingeborg 
Schwenzer, LL.M„ Professor of Private Law, University of Basel, Comment 4.4. 
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and predictability32 and thus thirty years ago33 has convincingly discarded the 
concept of ipso facto avoidance used under its predecessor ULIS,34 the DCFR 
surprisingly exhumes this approach. In case of an excusing impediment being 
permanent, the obligation as well as the 'reciprocal obligation' is automatically 
extinguished.35 In all other cases avoidance depends upon a declaration of the 
non-breaching party. This raises the obvious question how the aggrieved party 
shall know whether the impediment is excusing in the first place and permanent 
in the second. At the very same point in time - whether known by the parties or 
not - duties for restitution of performance received arise. Thus, the old Roman 
law concept of impossibilium nulla obligatio est celebrates its triumphant 
resurrection. 
3. Damages 
The rules on damages in the DCFR36 by and large follow those of the CISG.37 
The DCFR now clarifies that non-economic loss is encompassed.38 Although the 
wording of Article 74 sentence 1 CISG is already broad enough to also cover 
non-economic loss, given the reluctance in many legal systems to acknowledge 
non-economic detriments as loss in the technical sense, this clarification is to be 
welcome. The same holds true with regard to the express reference to future loss 
and thus the loss of a chance which is still disputed under the CISG.39 
However, again in this area slight differences remain. The CISG clearly 
distinguishes between a causation of the breach by the creditor and the mitigation 
of damages.40 Where the creditor has caused the breach of contract by the debtor, 
it may not resort to any remedies. In contrast, a breach of the duty to mitigate 
only entails a reduction or exclusion of damages. The difference between these 
concepts is reflected by the CISG also with regard to its systematic approach. The 
causation of breach by the creditor is dealt with under the section on exemption 
from liability, while the mitigation of damages appears in the section on damages. 
Although the DCFR in principle distinguishes between the two cases, both of 
them only restrict the creditor's right to damages. This systematic failure has 
severe consequences; for example, the creditor being able to avoid a contract, 
even though it caused the breach itself. 
32 See C. Fountoulakis, in Commentary, supra note 13, Art. 26, para. 1; for the general principle 
derived from Article 26 CISG that under the CISG a party's rights take only effect upon declaration 
see Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 13, Art. 7, para. 30. 
33 Study bei CF Art. 26 Rn 2 
34 Fountoulakis, supra note 13, Art. 26, para. l with references. 
35 Art. III.-3:104(4) DCFR. 
36 Art. 111.-3:701 DCFR et seq. 
37 Huber, supra note 4, at 730. 
38 Art. III.-701(3) DCFR. On the understanding of 'non-pecuniary loss' and its consequences 
for the CISG see 1. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, The Scope of the CISG Provisions on Damages, in 
D. Saidov & R. Cunnington (Eds.), Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives 
100 (2008). 
39 See Schwenzer, supra note 13, Art. 74, para. 3 7; Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 38, at 97 et seq. 
40 Arts. 80, 77 CISG 
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III. Force Majeure and Hardship 
Both the CISG as well as the DCFR provide that the debtor is exempted from 
liability for damages in case of an impediment beyond its control.41 Except for the 
already mentioned ipso facto avoidance in case of a permanent impediment, the 
DCFRforce majeure provision can be regarded as being more or less equivalent 
to that of the CISG. 
Unlike the CISG the DCFR contains a specific provision on variation or 
termination by court in case of a change of circumstances commonly referred 
to as hardship.42 For various reasons, this provision is not convincing. First, it 
seems preferable to deal with bothforce majeure and hardship under the same 
provision as it is done under the CISG.43 All too often drawing the line between 
force majeure and hardship is not possible. Most subsequent events do not render 
performance impossible and thus do not constitute a veritable impediment; they 
just render performance more onerous for the debtor. The prerequisites as weil as 
the consequences for both cases should be the same. Especially, contrary to what 
the DCFR suggests,44 there should be no difference between an initial hardship 
and hardship caused by a change of circumstances subsequent to the conclusion 
of the contract. In case of initial hardship under the DCFR the debtor would have 
to rescind the contract for mistake. Finally, the consequences of hardship laid 
down in the DCFR are unsatisfactory - at least with regard to sales contracts. The 
parties' duty to renegotiate45 as well as a possible adjustment of the contract to 
the changed circumstances by a court or arbitral tribunal is of practical use only 
in long-term relationships but usually not in sales contracts. All in all, here again, 
the results achievable under the CISG are more satisfactory than those under the 
DCFR.46 
41 Art. 79 CISG; Art. III.-3: 104 DCFR. 
42 Art. IIl.-1:110 DCFR. 
43 The modemised Gennan law of obligations also contains independent rules on impossibility 
(§275 CC) and hardship (§313 CC). In particular, the relationship between the provision on 
impossibility due to perfonnance having become overly onerous for the debtor (§275(2) CC) 
and the provision on adaptation of the contract to changed circumstances rendering perfonnance 
overly onerous for the debtor (§313(1) CC) has now caused considerable debate as regards their 
delimitation, see P. Schlechtriem & M. Schmidt-Kessel, Schuldrecht -Allgemeiner Teil, para. 485 
(2005). 
44 See Art. III.-!: 110(3) DCFR: "applies only if: (a) the change of circumstances occurred afterthe 
time when the obligation was incurred." 
45 Art. Ill.-1:110(3)(d) DCFR 
46 See for the solution offered under the CISG Schwenzer, supra note 13, Art. 79, para. 54; I. 
Schwenzer, Force Majeure and Hardship in International Safes Contracts, 39 Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 709, at 721 et seq, 724 (2009); I. Schwenzer, Die clausula und das 
CISG, in W. Wiegand et al. (Eds.), Tradition mit Weitsicht - Festschrift für Eugen Bucher zum 80. 
Geburtstag, 736 et seq. (2009); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 1, at 474, 475. 
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D. Filling the Gaps 
To evaluate the appropriateness of the DCFR it is useful to also have a look at 
those areas of sales law that do not have a counterpart in the CISG. As is weil 
known, it was not possible to make provision for all questions relating to sales 
contracts in the CISG; significant gaps remain. 
lt shall be discussed now, how the DCFR has filled these gaps and whether 
the interplay between the CISG and the DCFR in this respect yields satisfying 
results. Naturally, only a few select gaps can be discussed here. 
1. Precontractual Duties and Liability 
The CISG in principle does not contain any rules on precontractual duties; a 
proposition to insert a provision on culpa in contrahendo was even rejected at the 
Vienna Conference.47 
In contrast, the DCFR has devoted a whole chapter to marketing and 
precontractual duties.48 First ofall, a variety of information duties are established, 
a number of which also apply to B2B transactions.49 Admittedly, these information 
duties are prolific in B2C transactions for the simple reason of the discrepancy in 
bargaining power between businesses and consumers. However, in B2B contracts 
such extensive information duties seem to be inappropriate and by their simple 
breadth must necessarily lead to legal uncertainty that cannot be tolerated in 
international trade.50 
A further problem arises in connection with breaking off negotiations. Under 
the DCFR a person who breaks off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair 
dealing51 is liable for any lass which is not limited to the reliance interest but 
apparently also includes the expectation interest.52 This seems to be in stark 
contrast to the CISG where primary emphasis is placed on freedom of contract 
and even the binding effect of an offer is more limited than under the DCFR.53 
II. Non-negotiated Terms 
Of great practical importance especially in international sales contracts is the 
use of non-negotiated terms. The CISG does not even mention this notion. 
By contrast, the DCFR even distinguishes between non-negotiated terms and 
standard terms. For the latter it practically copies the German Civil Code54 and 
defines standard terms as non-negotiated terms which have been formulated in 
47 See U. G. Schroeter, in Commentary, supra note 13, intro to Arts. 14-24, para. 54,. 
48 Arts II.-3:101 - II.-3:501 DCFR. 
49 Arts II.-3: 101 - II.-3: 109 DCFR. 
so See S. Whittaker, The 'Draft Common Frame of Reference' - An Assessment, Report 
commissioned by the Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom 100 et seq. (2008). 
si See Art. 11.-3:301 DCFR. 
s2 Cf Art. 11.-3:501 DCFR. 
s3 Compare Art. l 6(2)(a) CISG and Art. II.-4:202(2), (3) DCFR. 
s4 § 305(1) sentences l, 3 CC 
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advance for several transactions involving different parties.55 The necessity for 
such a subtle distinction at best remains obscure. The dualism of two distinct 
concepts in this regard is unknown to any legal system be it on a domestic or on 
the European level.56 
The DCFR contains a specific regime for non-negotiated terms and standard 
terms as regards the incorporation of such terms into the contract as well as the 
judicial control of unfair terms. 
1. Incorporation 
On the level of incorporation, problems arise where non-negotiated terms are to 
be incorporated by reference. The DCFR explicitly states that mere reference is 
not sufficient.57 Whether this means that also in B2B contracts the terms actually 
have to be sent to the other party remains unclear.58 If this were the case this 
would be a true obstacle to swift contract formation on the international level that 
hardly any trader will expect. 59 
Further difficulties arise with regard to the battle of forms. The provision dealing 
with this issue only applies to standard terms but not to mere non-negotiated 
terms.60 lt is hard to see the underlying ratio of this approach. Regardless of this 
fact, this provision in essence does not add much to what is the prevailing opinion 
under the CISG.61 
2. Substantive Control 
Whereas under the CISG the substantive control of (all) contract terms in principle 
is a question of validity and thus left to the applicable domestic law,62 the DCFR 
contains specific provisions for this matter. However, under the DCFR in B2B 
55 Cf the definitions in DCFR Annex 1. 
56 See Art. 3 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terrns in consumer contracts, 
which dispenses with the requirement that the terrns have been drafted for use in more than one 
transaction. 
57 Art. II.-9:103(3)(b) DCFR. 
58 Under the CISG the matter is disputed. The Gerrnan BGH has held that non-negotiated terrns 
must be sent to the other party, see BGH, 31 October 2001, CISG-online 617. Subsequent decisions 
of other courts have also adopted this requirement. Nevertheless, there are also court decisions and 
a number of scholarly writings taking a different view. See for this dispute and an account of the 
opinions voiced with references Schroeter, supra note 13, Art. 14, paras. 36-46. 
59 This criticism has also been advanced against BGH, 31October2001, CISG-online 617, see 
M. Schmidt-Kessel, Einbeziehung von Al/gemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen unter UN-Kaufrecht, 36 
NJW 3446 (2002). 
60 See the heading and wording of Art. 11.-4:209 DCFR. 
61 Under the Convention the dispute has narrowed down to two approaches; the so-called last-
shot-doctrine and the so-called knock-out-doctrine. Under the first doctrine the non-negotiated 
terrns which have been sent last become part ofthe contract. Under the second doctrine, conflicting 
terrns are stricken out and replaced by the default rule. This second view has come to be the 
prevailing view under the CISG, see Cass civ ler, 16 July 1998, CISG-online 344; BGH, 9 January 
2002, CISG-online 651; Schroeter, supra note 13, Art. 19, para. 36 with numerous references also 
for domestic laws and uniform projects. 
62 See Art. 4 sentence 2(a) CISG; Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 13, Art. 4, para. 30. 
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transactions a contract term may be regarded unfair only if it is forming part of 
standard terms - neither ne~otiated terms nor simple non-negotiated terms are 
subject to judicial scrutiny.6 These rules significantly lag behind any domestic 
and international standard for a control of unfair terms even in B2B contracts. 
This is reinforced by the fact that the DCFR actually seems to allow to exclude 
or restrict any remedies for intentional or grossly negligent breach of contract as 
long as this does not relate to personal injury.64 This is a result unknown to any 
other legal system. 
III. Interest 
A last lacuna under the CISG which is of great practical importance must be 
addressed here. Although the CISG provides that interest is due on any sum in 
arrears,65 it does not state the applicable interest rate.66 The DCFR contains two 
provisions on interest one of which is a general rule on interest (Art. III.-3:708 
DCFR) whereas the other specifically applies to commercial transactions (Art. 
111.-3:710 DCFR). However, apart from the type of transaction, the respective 
scope of these provisions also depends on what kind of sum is due. While 
Article 111.-3 :708(1) DCFR applies to the payment of any "sum of money," thus 
including damages, Article 111.-3:710 DCFR by its wording only applies to "the 
payment of a price. "67 This difference is crucial in practice. From these provisions 
it follows that in case the buyer is late in paying the purchase price in a B2B sales 
contract, the interest rate is fixed at seven fsercentage points above the interest 
rate applied by the European Central Bank. 8 On the other hand, where either of 
the parties is liable for damages, it is the interest rate at the average commercial 
bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers prevailing for the currency of 
payment at the place where payment is due. 69 While the approach taken towards 
late payment of the price in commercial contracts is reasonable and practical, this 
cannot be said for the approach taken towards payments of damages. Determining 
the average interest rate would first require to know the exact date of payment, 
which at the time a court decision or award is rendered is wholly unpredictable. 
Even if the date of payment were known, to determine the average interest rate 
necessitates complicated mathematical operations as the short-term lending rate 
ftuctuates from day to day and depends on the number of days defined as 'short 
63 Art. II.-9:405 DCFR 
64 Art. III.-3:105(1) DCFR 
65 Art. 78 CISG. 
66 See K. Bacher, in Commentary, supra note 13, Art. 78, para. 2 with references. 
67 Oddly enough, the heading to Art. IIl.-3:710 DCFR reads 'lnterest in Commercial Contracts' 
and thus seems to establish a !ex specialis for commercial contracts. As the provision does only 
refer to payment of a price, the plain wording would suggest that in commercial transactions there 
is no interest on damage claims. This was certainly not intended. 
68 See Art. IIl.-3:710(4) DCFR. This corresponds to the Directive 2000/35/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial 
transactions. 
69 Art. III.-3:708(1) DCFR. 
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term'. We fail to see why in commercial contracts sums payable as damages are 
subject to a wholly different interest rate than the purchase price. Interest rates 
fixed in accordance with Article 111.-3:710 DCFR regularly exceed the interest 
rate fixed in accordance with Article 111.-3:708(1) DCFR by approximately 2%. 
In our opinion, the approach taken by the DCFR is hardly reconcilable with the 
principle of füll compensation under the CISG. Rather, decision making and 
especially enforcement proceedings become unnecessarily complicated. 
E. Codifying Style and Techniques 
As concems the different codifying style and techniques of the CISG and 
the DCFR, one is first struck by the sheer length of the DCFR compared to 
the relatively short CISG.70 This is partly due to the approach taken towards 
definitions. Under the CISG definitions are a rare exception. Their absence has 
not led to any problems. Contrary to the CISG, the DCFR first of all contains 
an Annex with no less than 163 definitions. While it is to be lauded that the 
drafters have attempted to achieve a common understanding of legal terms, it is 
hardly understandable why the text ofthe DCFR again is packed with sometimes 
repetitive and sometimes further definitions.71 
The sheer length of the DCFR does not, however, contribute to clarity.72 
Already the attempt to include as many scenarios as possible into the wording 
of the DCFR has considerably embellished the text. Often, too, where the 
CISG needs but half a sentence to express an idea, this translates into a whole 
paragraph in the DCFR. 73 This prolixity, however, has not prevented the drafters 
from an exorbitant74 use of general clauses. The CISG although using much less 
general clauses already has been blamed for its vagueness.75 The DCFR from this 
viewpoint will be hardly acceptable especially to Common Law lawyers. 76 
Furthermore, the drafters of the DCFR have opted for extensive cross-
referencing, whereas this technique is only rarely to be found in the CISG. To 
say the least, this does not enhance easy readability. Apart from the German 
Civil Code there is no international or domestic codification making use of such 
70 Harsh criticism from Huber, supra note 4, at 742: "The provisions on sales law have to be 
completely reformulated. [„.] The reader should not be given the impression that the drafters 
think it tobe slow-witted." Also H. Eidenmüller et al„ Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmenfiir das 
Europäische Privatrecht - Wertungs/ragen und Kodifikationsprobleme, 2008 Juristen Zeitung 529, 
at 549: "Reading the DCFR is tiring, because so much of its content is superfluous and because it 
contains numerous repetitions." 
71 See Eidenmüller et al„ supra note 70, at 530. 
72 See id„ at 549; Huber, supra note 4, at 742. 
73 Compare Art. 39(2) CSG andArt. IV.A.-4:302(3) DCFR. 
74 See Eidenmüller et al„ supra note 70, at 536 who provide an impressive account ofthe excessive 
use of general clauses in the DCFR. 
75 Against this criticism Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 1, at 467. 
76 See for the concems raised in the United Kingdom the Report issued by the European Union 
Committee ofthe House of Lords, European Contract Law: The Draft Common Frame of Reference 
- Report with Evidence, London: House of Lords, Stationary Office para. 31 et seq. (2009). 
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extensive cross-referencing. Also modern codifications such as the 2002 Estonian 
Law of Obligations Act or the 1999 Contract Law of the People's Republic of 
China manage to do without this technique. 
Finally, it has tobe regretted that the DCFR does not use the same terminology 
as the CISG. The drafters of the CISG endeavoured to depart from domestic legal 
concepts instead seeking an independent legal language. Indeed, to a large extent, 
they succeeded. The DCFR tries to reinvent the wheel changing terminology 
that for almost thirty years now has become the lingua franca of international 
sales law. A prominent and for trade practice crucial example is the replacement 
of the term 'avoidance for breach of contract' used by the CISG by the term 
'termination' in the DCFR. The fact that the very term avoidance is used by the 
DCFR in the context of mistake is hardly helpful to ease communication. 77 
Last but not least, let us imagine lawyers in court or arbitral proceedings cite 
the provisions of the CFR such as Article IV.A.-4:302(3) CFR instead of simply 
Article 39(2) CISG. 
F. Conclusion 
The question whether the future CFR can be an alternative to the CISG must be 
discussed on two levels, the European as well as the global one. 
Considering the CFR as a European instrument, be it an optional instrument or 
just a toolbox for legislators, it does not provide a viable alternative to the CISG. 
Practice needs a simple uniform law for all international and domestic sales 
contracts. This is why many modern legislators, especially in Eastern Europe, 
modelled their domestic sales law according to the CISG.78 
Imagining the CFR being an optional instrument on the European level, 
probably no sensible trader would opt for it. In essence this would mean that 
sellers and buyers would need to adapt their contracts to three different situations, 
domestic, European and global. Furthermore, the experiences made with the PICC 
clearly show that parties do not make use of optional instruments in their choice 
of law clauses.79 Whereas about 80% of disputes resolved under the auspices of 
the ICC contain a choice oflaw clause, in only 0.8% of these contracts opting-in 
instruments such as the PICC are chosen, although they may be well appropriate 
77 We are aware that PICC and PECL follow the same terminology as the DCFR. However, both 
sets of rules do not contain specific provisions on sales law and already their departure from the 
language ofthe CISG is most unfortunate. 
78 See P. Schlechtriem, 25 Years ofthe C/SG: An International linguafrancafor Drafting Uniform 
Laws, Legal Principles, Domestic Legislation and Transnational Contracts, in H. M. Flechtner et 
al. (Eds.), Drafting Contracts Under the CISG 167, 174, 177 (2008); F. Zoll, The Impact ofCISG on 
Polish law, 71 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und intemationals Privatrecht 81, at 81 et seq. 
(2007). 
79 P. Mankowski, CFR und Rechtswahl, in M. Schmidt-Kessel (Ed.), Der Gemeinsame 
Referenzrahmen - Entstehung, Inhalte, Anwendung 401 (2009). 
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to supplement the CISG.80 lt seems all the more improbable that parties would opt 
out of the CISG and into the CFR which in itself would have to be supplemented 
by domestic law. 
But also as a toolbox, the CFR is not an alternative to the CISG. The CISG 
itself has already proven as a useful toolbox not only on the European but also 
on the global level. The foregoing remarks have shown that the sales mies of 
the DCFR would not be an amelioration of the CISG. To the contrary, where 
the CISG has started to build reliable bridges between Civil Law and Common 
Law and continues to foster the acceptance of the idea of the unification of laws, 
the DCFR has fuelled old disputes and prejudices. This is particularly due to the 
fact that is has been influenced heavily by German legal thinking culminating in 
the adoption of exclusively German concepts81 and quasi-literal translations of 
provisions of the German Civil Code.82 
In conclusion, it does not come as a surprise that the CFR will never serve 
as a model on a global scale. Rather, let us continue to develop solutions under 
the CISG and to guard its uniform application and interpretation. lt is important 
that Europe maintains its leading position in the development of the CISG and 
raises its voice in the global concert. Therefore, the only recommendation is to 
even strengthen the role of the CISG in the area of sales law in Europe. Any 
harmonisation or unification oflaws in Europe must ensure that the CISG remains 
untouched. 83 
80 Jd., at 401. 
81 This is particularly obvious for the tenn 'Juridical Act' which is an attempt to retain the Gennan 
concept of 'Rechtsgeschäft', see Ernst, supra note 7, at 58: hardly successful translation. Another 
example is the formal confinnation of contract between businesses in Art. 11.-4:210 DCFR which 
codifies the classic Gennan concept of 'Kaufmännisches Bestätigungsschreiben'. 
82 See with regard to the unwinding of contracts upon breach of contract B. Jud, Die Principles of 
European Contract Law als Basis des Draft Common Frame of Reference, in Schmidt-Kessel (Ed.), 
Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen - Entstehung, Inhalte, Anwendung 87 (2009). 
83 For different scenarios which are conceivable and advocating convincing solutions U. G. 
Schroeter, UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht-Verhältnis und Wechselwirkungen 
(2009), § 18, para. 1 et seq. 
